IN THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MARGARET M. PORTER, )
) Case Number: 01 C 9106
Plaintiff, )
) Judge John F. Grady
v. )
) Magistrate Judge Nan R. Nolan
FAIRBANKS CAPITAL CORP. et al., )
)
Defendants. )
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD WITH
RESPECT
TO MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND TO LIFT STAY OF
DISCOVERY
Plaintiff respectfully requests leave to supplement the record on the motions to dismiss (one by each defendant) pending before the Court with (a) an “Interim Servicing Agreement” between defendant CitiFinancial and defendant Fairbanks (Appendix A) and (b) the full text of the “Asset Purchase Agreement” between defendant CitiFinancial and defendant Fairbanks (Appendix B), including particularly a “Power of Attorney” that follows numbered page 27 of Appendix B.
Plaintiff further requests that the Court lift the stay of discovery heretofore entered and permit plaintiff to conduct discovery with respect to the transfer of servicing between CitiFinancial and Fairbanks and which loans are classified by Fairbanks as “current”.
In support of this motion, plaintiff states:
i) Count XII of the second amended complaint alleges that between April 1, 2001 and April 15, 2001, Fairbanks and CitiFinancial entered into an agreement pursuant to which servicing rights on plaintiff’s loan and numerous other loans (“CitiFinancial portfolio”) were transferred to Fairbanks, that the right to collect payments on the CitiFinancial portfolio was transferred to Fairbanks, but that borrowers were not informed of this transfer until a notice was sent out in mid-May 2001, stating that the change would become effective June 2, 2001.
ii) Plaintiff alleges that this violated the Cranston-Gonzales amendment to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §2605, which requires advance notice of the change in servicing.
iii) The key date is “the effective date of transfer of the servicing of the mortgage loan”, which is defined (§ 2605(i)(1)) as “the date on which the mortgage payment of a borrower is first due to the transferee servicer of a mortgage loan pursuant to the assignment, sale, or transfer of the servicing of the mortgage loan.”
iv) “[A]
plaintiff is free, in defending against a motion to dismiss, to allege without
evidentiary support any facts he pleases that are consistent with the
complaint, in order to show that there is a state of facts within the scope of
the complaint that if proved (a matter for trial) would entitle him to
judgment.” Early v. Bankers Life and
Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1992).
v) The “Interim Servicing Agreement” provides (Appendix
A, §7) that during the period between April 6, 2001 and June 1, 2001,
Fairbanks shall be entitled to receive all funds paid with respect to the
CitiFinancial Portfolio. The
“effective date of transfer of the servicing of the mortgage loan” is thus
April 6, 2001.
vi) The
“Interim Servicing Agreement” further provides that CitiFinancial “shall
continue to service the Loans in name only” between April 6, 2001 and June 1,
2001. (Appendix A, §4)
vii) It
was also agreed that Fairbanks would
take over the employees who serviced the loans for CitiFinancial, and
that effective April 6, 2001, Fairbanks “shall have complete control over
[CitiFinancial’s] employees, including the supervision and assignment of such
employees and any employment-related or servicing-related decisions.” (Appendix A, §3(c))
viii) The
“Asset Purchase Agreement” (Appendix B) includes a “Power of Attorney”
in which CitiFinancial appointed Fairbanks its attorney-in-fact with authority
to “execute any documents or instruments necessary to collect payments against,
or to liquidate or cancel any mortgage subject to, the Purchase Agreement in
accordance with such Purchase Agreement, including the endorsement of any check
or other instrument made payable to Seller [CitiFinancial] . . . .” Thus, when borrowers’ checks payable to
CitiFinancial arrived, Fairbanks could endorse them and deposit them in its
account.
ix) It
is apparent from the “Interim Servicing Agreement” and the Power of Attorney
that Count XII of plaintiff’s complaint is correct, that Fairbanks had the
right to the payments on the CitiFinancial portfolio on and after April 6,
2001, and that CitiFinancial and Fairbanks engaged in a subterfuge to evade
compliance with the notification provisions of § 2605(e) for over a month.
x) Plaintiff
has managed to obtain this evidence without the benefit of discovery. It is clear from the “Interim Servicing
Agreement” itself that there are other documents which contain pertinent
information (e.g., the “Employee Assumption Agreement” and the “Lease
Agreement” referred to therein) and witnesses with relevant knowledge (e.g.,
whoever drafted and signed the “Interim Servicing Agreement” and the “Power of
Attorney”).
xi) CitiFinancial
had submitted 6 pages of the “Asset Purchase Agreement,” not including the Power of Attorney, as an
exhibit to its reply brief in support of its motion to dismiss, representing to
the Court that these were the only
“relevant pages of the Agreement.”
(Reply brief, p. 3)
CitiFinancial further represented that “this Court can and should
consider the Agreement made between CF and Fairbanks to determine whether
Plaintiff has properly stated a claim under RESPA” on the theory that the
agreement is “central to her [plaintiff’s] claim for violation of RESPA” (Reply
brief, p. 3 n. 1). Based on the
incomplete Asset Purchase Agreement, CitiFinancial argued in its reply
brief (p. 3) that “The agreement
between CF and Fairbanks provides that ‘The date on which the servicing of the
Mortgage Loans for RESPA purposes is transferred to [Fairbanks] pursuant to
this Agreement . . . shall be June 1, 2001'".
xii) It
is apparent from the “Interim Servicing Agreement” and the missing pages of the
“Asset Purchase Agreement,” particularly the Power of Attorney, that the actual substance of the arrangements
between CitiFinancial and Fairbanks Capital was the precise opposite of what
CitiFinancial represented based on the incomplete “Asset Purchase
Agreement.” As plaintiff alleged,
Fairbanks had the right to and would in fact collect all payments on the loans
from April 6, 2001.
xiii) Significantly, another court
recently found that Fairbanks attempted
to deceive it and is unworthy of belief. In re Maxwell, 2002 WL 1586325, *13 (D.Mass., July 16,
2002). The court there found that “Fairbanks, in a shocking
display of corporate irresponsibility, repeatedly fabricated the amount of the
Debtor's obligation to it out of thin air. There is no other explanation for
the wildly divergent figures it concocted in correspondence with the
Debtor and her agents and in pleadings and documents filed with the bankruptcy
court.”
xiv) This Court should permit
plaintiff to conduct discovery to uncover the facts, rather than rely on
defendants’ representations, supported by incomplete and misleading excerpts
from documents.
Respectfully submitted,
_______________________
Daniel A. Edelman
Daniel A. Edelman
Cathleen M. Combs
James O. Latturner
Adela C. Lucchesi
EDELMAN, COMBS & LATTURNER, LLC
120 S. LaSalle Street, 18th floor
Chicago, Illinois 60603
(312) 739-4200
(312) 419-0379 (FAX)
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